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This article sets out to review the policies introduced by the European Pillar of 
Social Rights and its accompanying initiatives in light of their contribution to EU 
social sustainability, particularly in comparison to their predecessors. The balance 
between economic and social policies at EU level has long been tipped in favour 
of the economic, leaving an atrophic social side a servant of market-based 
objectives. Social sustainability appeared absent from the European vocabulary, at 
least in substantive terms, something exacerbated by the effects of the 2008 crisis. 
The criticisms that ensued led to a resurgence of interest in establishing a socially 
sustainable Union, crystallised in the Pillar and its accompanying initiatives. 
Despite their potential, further commitment by the Member States as well as more 
concrete and legally-binding proposals are necessary, for without them this social 
resurgence might once again surrender to economic hegemony. 
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Introduction 
Sustainability as a term is and has been en vogue in policy-drafting and making roughly 
during the last three decades, ever since the 1987 Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development entitled ‘Our Common Future’ (WCED, 1987). 
Sustainability, or sustainable development, were thus inextricably linked to 
environmental issues and concerns, trying to strike a balance between the environment, 
the economy and society. This article departs from the tight confines of the popular 
environment-centred theoretical understanding of sustainability, choosing to focus 
instead on its social side, to analyse it emancipated from environmental considerations. 
Apart from environmental deterioration, 21st century brought also a decrease in labour 
and welfare standards worldwide, through the ‘race to the bottom’ mantra, which was 






only exacerbated during the global economic and financial crisis (Singh and Zammit, 
2004). The crisis escalated the issue from one largely affecting the development of 
comprehensive protection mechanisms in the Global South to a universal one, dictating 
labour market deregulation and social policy dilution in countries with traditionally high 
levels of welfare provision and employment protection (Heyes and Lewis, 2013).  
The European Union (EU) did not weather the crisis unscathed. To the contrary it 
represents a textbook example of constant deregulation and welfare retrenchment in many 
of its crisis-hit Member States, up until recently known for their models of social 
protection. This led to allegations that the so-called European Social Model is dead, or at 
least burdensome for economic competitiveness in the current globalised setting 
(Vaughan-Whitehead, 2015). For economists, the EU Member States were, simply put, 
not economically sustainable enough, and dismantling the social acquis could boost 
economic activity and ease overstretched public finances (Clauwaert and Schömann, 
2012). Social protection was not worthy of conservation, being the easy target to succumb 
when confronted with economic pressure. Yet this position should not come as a surprise. 
The balance between economic and social policies at EU level has long been skewed in 
favour of the former, with the latter adopted predominantly if they were perceived as 
instrumental in advancing the internal market.  
The development of social laws and policies at EU level, formally known as the 
social acquis, was incremental to say the least, and even normatively significant reforms, 
such as the introduction of the social market economy paradigm with the Lisbon Treaty, 
were largely side-lined. Creating a sustainable Social Europe appeared for the most part 
absent from the vocabulary of the key stakeholders, at least in substantive terms. For 
example, since the mid-1990s, instead of entrenching social sustainability through law 






and policy-making, more subdued and rather political methods were promoted, such as 
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which to date has produced questionable 
results (de la Porte, 2002). Unlike well-trodden areas of EU policy-making, 
environmental policy included, social policy as a whole relied for the most part on setting 
minimum standards, something that hinders upwards convergence at EU level (Scharpf, 
2002). 
EU social sustainability, has thus, been underdeveloped compared to both its 
environmental and economic counterparts. This ‘welfare neglect’ was further exacerbated 
through the response of the EU institutions to the effects of the 2008 crisis in some of the 
Member States, as manifested in the reforms included in the bailout packages and which 
had dubious results (Hemerijk, 2016). The criticisms that ensued led to a resurgence of 
interest in establishing a socially sustainable Union, crystallised in the newly-introduced 
European Pillar of Social Rights and its accompanying initiatives. To the extent that these 
promote hard law measures in tandem with soft-law mechanisms, this signals a departure 
from the almost exclusively soft-law approach of the OMC. The Pillar pushes forward a 
more pronounced conceptualisation of social provision at EU level to render welfare an 
equal counterpart to the Union’s strong economic component. Can social sustainability 
finally feature at the forefront of the European agenda? Although the Pillar certainly 
represents a laudable development, the danger of relapsing is still lurking.  
This article sets out to review the policies introduced by the Pillar and its 
accompanying measures in light of their contribution to EU social policy and to the 
establishment of a sustainable Social Europe, particularly in comparison to their 
predecessors. It begins by mapping out the exact definition of sustainability used for the 
purposes of the analysis, which departs from the classic conceptions of it as part of the 






environmental-centred sustainable development. A short overview of the development of 
Social Europe then follows, showing the haphazard attempts for advancing the social 
dimension of the EU, and ending with the ongoing post-crisis social resurgence. Then, 
the Pillar and its accompanying measures are assessed vis-à-vis their potency to achieve 
a socially sustainable EU. The article concludes by arguing that more concrete and 
legally-binding provisions are necessary, for without them this social resurgence might 
again surrender to economic hegemony, and any hopes for social sustainability will be 
shattered in the wake of a revived market subordination.  
Social Sustainability at EU Level: A Definition 
Whilst social considerations were taken into account by the Brundtland Commission 
when drafting the 1987 Report, their role was only incremental and largely perceived as 
a precondition for achieving a sustainable ecosystem. The primacy of the environmental 
side of sustainable development is the hallmark of the one-pillar model of sustainable 
development where all other components are regulated in order to achieve optimal 
ecological effects (Littig and Grießler, 2005). Social sustainability thus turns into a 
prompter for the starring environmental pillar. Subsequent conferences, starting with the 
1992 Rio Earth Summit, adopted what was coined as the three-pillar model, which 
accorded equal importance to environmental, economic and social development. Or so 
was the intention on paper. The strong environmental and ecological heritage of the 
concept of sustainable development forged a quasi-constitutionalised environmental 
pillar that reigned above the other two (Pepper, 1996). Moreover, between the remaining 
two, the economic pillar almost de facto overtook the social one, given the largely market-
oriented, neoliberal and capitalistic context in which the world economy operates. Social 






sustainability became a laggard. Not only that, it also became contested as a concept of 
scholarly interest, lacking even a commonly agreed core (Dempsey et al, 2011). 
The work of Littig and Grießler represents the most comprehensive attempt to 
coin the key conceptual characteristics of social sustainability to date (2005). The authors 
acknowledge the absence of a theoretical consensus on the concept and, drawing on the 
sustainable development literature, try to decipher common elements, which they then 
combine in their analysis in order to conceptualise social sustainability. For them, social 
sustainability is more than a minimum floor of social rights trying to satisfy basic human 
needs. It strives to satisfy those, but also contains an aspirational side, and to some extent 
idealistic, aiming for social justice and social coherence. All within the context of work, 
which plays a defining role in achieving those objectives. More specifically, in a 
European setting, they define social sustainability as efforts to devise, implement and 
provide ‘effective and coordinated measures to promote and ensure employment for all 
citizens … [and] … a sensible reduction of working hours – and adequate social security 
to make up for it – which will allow a fairer distribution of (paid and unpaid) work among 
the genders’ (Ibid, 75-76). This involves state-funded welfare provision, and protective 
labour market policies. 
Given the nature of social sustainability as an outlier, lacking a widely-accepted 
definition and being instead a rather catch-all concept, then specifying its actual meaning 
in the context of this paper is important. Different disciplines adopt different perspectives 
on what social sustainability might mean, also depending on the exact sub-field that is 
examined (Weingaertner and Moberg, 2014). Contextualising the framework and the 
applicable narratives, sculpting a sui generis and independent definition of the concept, 
renders the definition provided by Littig and Grießler relevant to the present analysis. For 






the purposes of this article the quest for social sustainability in the EU does not involve a 
box ticking exercise on the Millennium Development Goals, nor a hysteria with keeping 
public finances in order. It also does not refer to the social-environmental relationship, 
scholars of urban and environmental science focus on (Boström, 2012). At EU-level with 
its long-standing market-oriented tradition simply having a discernibly sustainable social 
side is crucial. If nothing else, to come a step closer to the realisation of the more holistic 
visions of the Union as a supranational entity. 
Social sustainability in the peculiar European welfare space has less to do with 
the financing of welfare provision and more with keeping the social acquis going, not 
through a lifeline but through growth, in order to become developed enough to withstand 
crises-induced shocks and neoliberalism-fuelled assaults. It is more fruitful to discuss this 
aspect of EU social sustainability, involving, as Littig and Grießler noted, re-distributive 
policies and good employment conditions, as the economic and social side of EU policy-
making are not in parity at the moment. It is, thus, pivotal to focus on the policies in place 
that can promote, and most importantly sustain, the social dimension of the EU, from 
being subsumed by or becoming subordinated to the internal market and the economic 
pillar’s imperatives. Consequently, for the purposes of this article, social sustainability at 
EU level is defined as the set of policies, rules and principles laid down in the EU legal 
order, and which aim to reinforce the social dimension of the EU as a long-term solution, 
ring-fencing it from any relapse into a position of hierarchical subordination to the 
markets, so that Social Europe can unequivocally be perceived an equal counterpart to 
the economic constitution.  
Such conceptualisation of social sustainability acts neither as a heuristic nor as a 
sticking plaster. It sets a benchmark for evaluating the success of any policy initiative in 






sustainably serving social objectives. By concretising the concept’s elements, what needs 
to be done is made clear. The total market thinking, in its heyday following the 
entrenchment of austerity policies in the course of the crisis, needs to give way to the 
entrenchment of long undermined genuine social laws, policies and rights, not ersatz of 
those, mere token gestures with no teeth like what was happening in the past 
(Christodoulidis, 2017). This way the social could be constitutionalised as an equal 
counterpart to the economic. In turn, this will inevitably necessitate shifts in the current 
architecture of the European project, so as to balance what have now been designated as 
antagonistic interests. Whilst social sustainability is seldom used when talking about the 
inner workings of the EU, realising its merits may liberate the European Social Model 
from its perpetual failings. In its true form, it inherently encompasses a call for reorienting 
the established constitutional dynamics within the Union. 
Needless to say, while the adopted definition can act as a useful point of reference 
in the context of EU social integration, or even in that of ‘the EU’s internal promotion of 
social development’ more broadly (Novitz, 2015: 243), it is by no means panacea. 
Adopting or worse yet, imposing ‘a singular, all-encompassing, definition […] denies 
much of the concept’s complexity’ (Vallance et al, 2011: 346). According to Vallance et 
al. the complexities embedded under the umbrella of social sustainability are in need of 
better appreciation, achieved by putting forward a more pluralistic approach towards the 
term (ibid). A pluralistic approach in light of the lacking social convergence at EU level, 
would better reflect the diverse welfare regimes among the Member States, laying the 
groundwork for more and better EU social policies in the future (de la Porte, 2002). 
Strengthening the core welfare and employment-friendly components of social 
sustainability sits at the heart of this discourse. Giving social sustainability the normative 






and policy push it deserves will cement its position as aequalis inter partes and might help 
to finally bring it to the forefront of discussion and debate. A debate not staged around 
social sustainability’s semantics, but emphasising how the other pillars of sustainable 
development can be re-arranged in order to truly complement and stimulate each other. 
A final note, the terms social sustainability, social dimension of the EU and Social Europe 
are used interchangeably herein. 
Attempting Social Sustainability at EU Level 
As noted above, this article focuses on the internal aspects of sustainable development at 
EU level, on how the Union’s social sustainability objectives could go beyond an agenda 
dominated by economic interests, looking at improving welfare and work conditions with 
an eye on the future (Novitz, 2010). But before delving into the recent initiatives, it would 
be beneficial to set out their context first. During the very beginning of the European 
project, the Paris negotiations in the 1950s envisaged a social dimension of the Union, 
which nonetheless the Treaty of Rome failed to incorporate, preferring a solely economic 
route for the then European Economic Community founded on embedded liberalism 
(Schiek, 2017). Granted a laconic and abstract social provisions chapter was there, but no 
competences allowing for meaningful EU action in the area came with it. Almost 
throughout the first two decades of the EU, its social dimension was in hibernation. 
Things slowly started to pick up in the 1970s, with the unveiling of the 1974 Social 
Action Programme and some accompanying policy-making, albeit confined in the areas 
of workers’ health and safety and non-discrimination (Geyer, 2000). The limited extent 
of the reforms, coupled with unwillingness by certain Member States’ governments at 
that time, namely that of Thatcher in the United Kingdom (UK) in 1979 and, to a lesser 
extent, of Kohl in Germany in 1982, to push for further social integration led things to a 






stalemate which spilled over well into the 1980s, despite the enactment of the Single 
European Act that brought the expansion of Qualified Majority Voting to the area of 
health and safety of workers (Brigford and Stirling, 1991; Moravcsik, 1998). To make 
matters worse, the 1985 internal market programme solidified this pattern of ‘welfare 
neglect’, with its exclusively economic nature, which, in turn, stirred a lively debate that 
prompted the Commission to issue a series of White Papers advocating for greater welfare 
provision (Silvia, 1991). 
Efforts culminated in 1989 with the enactment of the Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers, a halfway-house measure, given its non-binding character due 
to UK opposition, and, therefore, with limited impact on actually advancing the social 
acquis (Barnard, 2012).  In the meantime, a renewed interest emerged as regard to health 
and safety of workers, which represented one of the few sectors where concrete measures 
were adopted at that time (Anderson, 2015). A push for change came with the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992, whereby Member States, with the exception of the UK, wished to 
constitutionalise the social dimension further. Alas, the lack of unanimity, resulted yet in 
another soft-law measure annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, the Social Chapter, an 
umbrella term referring to the Protocol and its accompanying Agreement on Social Policy 
(Falkner, 1996). These were originally destined to form part of the Treaty itself, but were 
only embedded therein with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, following the waiver of 
the UK veto. 
The Social Chapter saga notwithstanding, the Maastricht Treaty contributed to the 
development of a European social core, extending the competences of the EU institutions 
in the area. It pushed Social Europe into the limelight as a counterweight to the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), also introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. The underlying 






aim was to avoid an asymmetrical development between the economic and the social 
(Jepsen and Serrano Pascual, 2005). It laid the seeds of a concrete plan for social 
sustainability, introducing to the discourse the notion of a European Social Model, which, 
unlike the ultraliberal American one, ‘represents the idea that European welfare states are 
legitimately diverse, but that they all aim to uphold high social standards, working 
conditions and well-being, which should be supported by the EU’ (de la Porte and Heins, 
2015: 9). The Model’s somewhat deferential stance to the Member States could be 
attributed to the association of welfare with national sovereignty, a stance that was bound 
to create problems in an enlarged, and thus more welfare-diverse EU, with common 
minima that gradually became eroded, also because of the crisis. Although ideational, the 
Maastricht plans for a socially sustainable EU did not translate into the corresponding 
policy change, leaving the attainment of Social Europe a work in progress (Dukes, 2014).  
Nonetheless, they were a good first step, cementing the need for a strong social dimension 
in the pertinent debates. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, in addition to incorporating the Social Chapter, also 
introduced a new section on employment policy and, more importantly for social 
sustainability, the goal to achieve high employment and social protection levels. In a way, 
it completed what the Maastricht Treaty started, by bestowing upon social policy 
‘distinctive aims, processes, new legal tools and new political actors’ (Szyszczak, 2001: 
1128). This was further strengthened only a couple of years later, where the negotiations 
for the Treaty of Nice introduced a panoply of soft-law initiatives such as the Social 
Policy Agenda, the Lisbon Strategy and the expansion of the OMC to various social 
policy areas (Kountouros, 2003). The latter though were more of a half-hearted effort to 
push for the realisation of social sustainability without impinging much on Member 






States’ sovereignty, having also half-hearted outcomes as a result (Barnard, 2012). Social 
Europe was in need of fresh -but also strong- air. The Treaty of Nice also saw the initial 
proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which included social rights therein, 
albeit without any constitutional power yet. 
In between Nice and the next treaty reforms in Lisbon, the next milestone for EU 
social sustainability after the foundation of the European Social Model came to light: the 
elusive concept of flexicurity. It represents an amalgam between the contradictory notions 
of flexibility and security as regards employment relationships, the labour market, and to 
some extent social security, and was particularly en vogue in the 2000s. It was a sign of 
a backtracking from efforts to initiate stronger social protection at EU level, calling for 
sustainability, yet giving rise to questions as to whether that was of social or economic 
nature (Heyes and Lewis, 2013). Moreover, it is also ‘a metonymic shift: from social 
protection to self-insurance’ according to Keune and Serrano (2014: 7). The purpose of 
flexicurity, thus, appears to be not to balance economic and social development, but to 
stop any progress on an autonomous social dimension, while prioritising free market 
demands. Despite hiding behind a questionable -as to its nature- sustainability premise, 
flexicurity has been criticised as unsustainable following its inability to withstand the 
effects of the crisis; decent and quality work and social protection, true to the spirit of 
genuine social sustainability have been proposed as an alternative (Méda, 2014). It is of 
no surprise then that flexicurity has nowadays been largely cast away from the EU 
agenda.  
While Nice’s contribution was insignificant, and flexicurity tried to retract rather 
than promote social sustainability, the Lisbon Treaty brought important changes that, if 
exploited, can help establish a truly social Social Europe. The Charter of Fundamental 






Rights became binding, gaining the same status as the Treaties, and Article 3(3) TEU 
replaced ‘open market economy with free competition’ with social market economy 
‘aiming at full employment and social progress’ as the new paradigm for the EU 
(Anderson, 2015). It represents a significant step forward, since, in normative terms, it 
gives equal footing to economic and social considerations, and can moreover support any 
substantial social development at EU level. Despite its potential, social market economy 
has not been capitalised on. Instead the EU institutions used to function as if nothing had 
changed, promoting a sustainability agenda that served primarily the economic, to some 
extent the environment, but to no extent the social pillar of sustainable development 
(Novitz, 2015). Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose, until the Pillar came along. 
Towards the European Pillar of Social Rights 
The Lisbon reforms would have gone under the radar, in terms of instigating path-
departure towards a stronger social sustainability component for the Union, but for the 
aftermath of the crisis. The latter shocked sequentially financial and labour markets alike, 
leaving its mark on the prevailing discourse. Not only that, but the crisis also distanced 
political leaders from the people, projecting an image of the EU as a neoliberal leviathan, 
showcasing the need for a re-orientation of the policy debate and the narratives employed 
therein (Schmidt, 2014). More and more expert voices now side with the people in calling 
for a balanced approach that brings social considerations on equal footing with economic 
ones (Deakin, 2012). Most importantly, these voices were no longer marginalised. Their 
social narratives were gradually held to be credible alternatives that merit to be put on the 
table when drafting the future direction of the European project. On top of that, the Brexit 
referendum’s result in June 2016 came as yet another shock to an EU that had not yet 
recovered from the aftermath of the crisis.






The critique of the crisis and the austerity policies that ensued, the, largely 
connected to those, disenfranchisement of the European demos, coupled with Brexit, all 
acted as drivers for redesigning the Union’s priorities, for socialising the policy arena 
aiming at a more socially sustainable EU. This was first reflected in the socialisation of 
the initially exclusively economic European Semester, in place to coordinate the Member 
States’ economic and financial policies, through its infusion with social objectives, 
particularly as regards to Country Specific Recommendations (Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 
2018). Nonetheless, the latter, much like the OMC, represent a softer side of European 
integration and policy-making, largely dependent on the Member States’ willingness to 
address those, without any particular carrot or stick in place (Verdun and Zeitlin, 2018). 
In a Union that is more diverse than ever, it is very hard to find the common ground that 
existed during the Maastricht era of the European Social Model. Moreover, the intensified 
free market thinking of the crisis, promoting deregulation and strict fiscal conditionality 
over ‘socialisation’, is unlikely to lead to Member States voluntarily espousing such 
policies, let alone spreading them EU-wide. Consequently, the recommendations would 
probably fail to generate the required impetus to drive social sustainability forward. At 
the same time though, they laid the groundwork for what was to come: Juncker vowing 
for the EU to achieve ‘a social triple-A rating: that is just as important as an economic 
and financial triple-A [one]’ (Juncker, 2014). 
In April 2017, the publication of the Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of 
Europe attempted to answer how the social triple-A could be achieved. The Paper sought 
to ‘galvanise Europe’s social spirit’ by presenting three options for the future of Social 
Europe (European Commission, 2017a). These boil down to a negligible social dimension 
as a corollary of free movement, a multi-speed one based on a common axis of minimum 






standards of protection much like what is in place today, or, an enhanced Social Europe 
with a more sustainable social acquis, although still allowing the Member States and 
social partners to have a say on the matter (Ibid). The Reflection Paper appears to subtly 
endorse the last scenario, attributing fewer ‘negatives’ to it compared to the other two; 
the difficulty in attaining unanimity among the 27 Member States and that some EU 
citizens may feel distanced by a more centralised decision-making at European level 
(Ibid). The third scenario is also supported by the Rome Declaration of March 2017, 
wherein a stronger and more sustainable Social Europe is featured among the key 
priorities for the EU in the course of the next decade (Council of the European Union, 
2017). Together, they contributed to crucial momentum-building so as to push for a 
serious consideration of the European Pillar of Social Rights and for concrete -if not 
daring- associated developments. 
The European Pillar of Social Rights and its Accompanying Initiatives: a 
Social Renaissance? 
Despite the consultation process for the European Pillar of Social Rights having been 
launched already in 2016, when a rough outline was presented to the public, the first 
concrete initiatives together with a more detailed outline were unveiled on the same day 
as the Reflection Paper on the social dimension of Europe was. This certainly was not 
coincidental and should be interpreted as a sign of the renewed commitment by the EU 
institutions, and the Commission in particular, to achieve a socially sustainable EU. The 
text of the Pillar is essentially a list of 20 rights and principles, revolving around three 
core strands: equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair working conditions, 
and social protection and inclusion. It spans across a range of welfare-related issues, from 
equality and social inclusion to education, housing and care, with a particular focus on 






employment policies, workers’ health and safety, social dialogue and social security. It is 
the most important EU document solely dedicated to such matters since the Agreement 
on Social Policy, from which it can be distinguished due to the breadth of areas that it 
covers. 
The Pillar is in a way the progeny of the whole social acquis. According to 
preambles 1 to 6 thereof, the social market economy paradigm, the social policy chapter 
of the Treaties, certain protective free movement of workers provisions, the Charter, as 
well as the horizontal clause of Article 9 TFEU calling for high level of employment, 
education, training and health, adequate social protection, and diminish social exclusion, 
all set the foundations for the catalogue of rights and principles that are incorporated in 
the text of the Pillar. It is obvious that the Pillar builds on those, and, moreover, tries to 
bring them out of the shadows and to shake off the lethargy that had characterised EU 
social policy-making over the last decade. The way to achieve this is via an increase in 
the actual take-up of social measures by the Member States, stimulated through an array 
of legislative and non-legislative measures by a primarily supporting and/or supervisory 
EU that respects the principle of subsidiarity (European Commission, 2017b). It 
represents a flexible approach, rooted in soft-law actions for the most part, and monitored 
by means of a Social Scoreboard. 
The high value placed on the Pillar by the EU stakeholders was further manifested 
by its proclamation soon afterwards, in November 2017 at the Gothenburg Social Summit 
for fair jobs and growth. The realisation of a stronger Social Europe seems to have been 
set as high priority. The proclamation also made a small but potentially significant 
alteration to the scope of the Pillar. While initially its scope was worded as being 
primarily for the euro area but applicable to the rest of the Member States that wish to opt 






in, this emphasis on its discretionary nature for non-eurozone Member States was 
noticeably played down by preamble 13 that now notes the relevance of the Pillar for the 
Eurozone, but moreover states that it is also addressed to all Member States. Considering 
the generally soft-law approach of the Pillar as a whole and the fact that there are no 
specific measures applicable solely to the Eurozone, accentuating the distinction between 
members and non-members of the euro area was superfluous, and therefore the amended 
wording can only be welcomed. For a genuine social sustainability at EU level ought to 
be sought beyond the confines of the EMU. 
The unveiling of the Pillar was accompanied by a proposal for a new Directive on 
work-life balance for parents and carers repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU 
(European Commission, 2017c) and an interpretative communication, summing up the 
Court of Justice’s case-law and best practice, on the implementation of the Working Time 
Directive 2003/88/EC (European Commission, 2017d). Meanwhile, on the same day, it 
was announced that the consultation process was launched with an aim to revise the 
Written Statement Directive 91/533/EEC on an employer's obligation to inform 
employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship. The 
proposal seeks to address the challenges posed to people in all forms of employment, and 
not just workers, when trying to access social protection. All in all, it was as if the 
European Commission wanted to demonstrate that its commitment to the social 
dimension of the EU is not just words reflected in principles like those spotted in the 
Pillar, but actions, tangible steps towards the realisation of the social promise undertaken 
by Juncker’s speech back in 2014. 
The proposal for the work-life balance Directive, which is to repeal the one on 
parental leave, aims to extend welfare policies on bridging work and family commitments 






to carers, enhance gender equality and employment opportunities for women, and lead to 
more men taking advantage of parental leave or other flexible working arrangements 
(European Commission, 2017e). To achieve that, the proposed provisions include a 
guaranteed level of pay for those taking parental leave, an independent right to paternity 
leave and carer’s leave of 10 and 5 days a year respectively, and a more thorough portfolio 
of various flexible working arrangements. These reforms were not embraced by the social 
partners representing the employers, as some of them, BusinessEurope and UEAPME, 
did not see the need for new laws in the area. That is why instead of the common -in EU 
social policy-making- method of Framework Agreement, the Commission here exercised 
its power to initiate legislation. Tackling rising concerns about work-life balance, is a 
timely issue, that was seen as an area of priority.  
Next in line of reforms were the issues discussed in the consultation processes of 
April 2017, namely adequate protection for workers in all forms of employment and the 
revision of the Written Statement Directive (91/533/EC). The consultation’s outcomes 
were combined, and a proposal for a new Directive on transparent and predictable 
working conditions was introduced in December 2017, again using the Commission’s 
legislative initiative, due to the lack of agreement between the social partners to negotiate 
a Framework Agreement (European Commission, 2017f). The Directive is to tackle 
another contemporary challenge, extending social protection to people in unconventional 
forms of work, and pushing for upwards convergence on the matter through the 
introduction in Article 2 of an EU-wide definition of worker, on the basis of the Court’s 
case-law. Not only that, but new minimum requirements as regards to working conditions 
are laid down in Chapter III of the proposed Directive, together with a more sophisticated 
set of sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms. If materialised, this Directive seems a 






serious step up from its predecessor, whose character was rather formalistic for the most 
part, without much of a tangible impact on workers’ protection, particularly for those on 
non-standardised employment contracts (Clark and Hall, 1992). 
2018 saw a follow-up to the Pillar, with a new Social Fairness Package revealed 
by the Commission. Its centrepiece is the European Labour Authority, that aims to be a 
first port of call for all sides involved in cross-border employment, and to monitor the 
operations of labour market mobility at EU level (European Commission, 2018a). This is 
to be followed by a proposal for a European Social Security Number, which will further 
strengthen the concept and identity of a socially caring and sustainable EU. An evaluation 
of the Directives embedding the Framework Agreements on fixed and part-time work by 
the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance programme (REFIT), aiming at 
their simplification and improvement, was also underway at the time of writing (European 
Commission, 2018b). The Social Fairness Package also includes a proposal for a Council 
Recommendation on accessing social protection for workers and the self-employed, 
which aims to complement the 2017 proposal for a Directive on transparent and 
predictable working conditions, by putting forward recommendations to Member States 
for action on issues affecting the access to welfare provision in various forms, namely 
social security, leave, and health and safety, of those not falling under the definition of 
worker (European Commission 2018c).  
Reflections: A Renaissance or a Revolution? 
Following the presentation of the developments, it is undeniable that notable efforts have 
taken place in the wake of the crisis to socialise the European project. A social renaissance 
has indeed happened, at least on paper, with a series of proposals on various front, all 
coming under the auspices of the European Pillar of Social Rights. Ensuring social 






sustainability at EU level, safeguarded from neoliberal economic interventions, finally 
became important. This is shown not only by the breadth of the proposed reforms, but by 
the pace of their introduction, which has not shown signs of a slow-down so far. One has 
to be cautious though, for reforms that are taken in a hurry, might not be without 
disadvantages. Although sometimes something is better than nothing, given the dearth of 
serious positive welfare reforms in recent years; to the contrary there was retrenchment 
pushed by the neoliberal reforms of the crisis. This section reflects on the recent 
developments to assess their contribution towards achieving a socially sustainable EU. 
The fast proclamation of the Pillar, roughly 7 months since its introduction, is a 
strong display of willingness and commitment by the key EU institutions to bolster the 
policy discourse as to prioritise a more comprehensive social sustainability agenda for 
the Union. A proclamation process was carried out in relation to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which was subsequently bestowed with Treaty-like status in the 
Lisbon Treaty reforms. Perhaps, the Pillar could have the same fate, and end up being 
part of the EU’s constitutional documents in the future. On the other hand, the social 
character of the Pillar might make this scenario unlikely if one takes into account the 
limited justiciability of the Charter’s social chapter, as demonstrated in the jurisprudence 
of the CJEU (Guðmundsdóttir, 2015). Considering the afore-mentioned problems with 
the now Treaty-like social provisions of the Charter, it is likely that similar issues may 
arise with a constitutionalised Pillar, hampering its enforceability.  
It might as well be that such ‘constitutional ambition’ was never envisaged for the 
Pillar, despite the breadth of its text and accompanying measures. Unlike the Agreement 
on Social Policy, there was no plan for it to be incorporated or somehow given equal 
standing with the Treaties. The risk then surfaces for the Pillar to become a tool of limited 






applicability, much like the Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. For 
the commitment to become reality, it needs to have support, and it is a hopeful sign that 
the Commission, the most powerful institution according to some, and the one that 
ascribes the most to free market thinking according to others, initiated the reforms. It was 
the pledge of Juncker, the Commission’s President, incited by the critiques of the policies 
taken during the crisis, to achieve a triple social A that put the EU ‘mills’ into action, and 
it is the Commission that introduced the proposals one right after the other in the course 
of 2016-2018. 
It is worth mentioning that this happened even in cases where the support of the 
social partners, and more specifically of the employers’ side, was lacking. Instead of 
choosing to wait until both employers and workers’ associations agreed to enter 
negotiations for the revision of the Parental Leave or Written Statement directives, the 
Commission defied the odds in a positive way, by opting to exercise its power to initiate 
legislation. It signals a new way of social policy-making, which shifts the focus from the 
partners’ agreement to the urgent nature of the measures, at least if social sustainability 
is a relatively imminently desired result, by speeding up the processes in place to achieve 
that. Whilst welcomed in bypassing possible vetoes by the employers’ side, it risks 
weakening the contribution that the employees’ side would have had therein. Union 
representatives’ pro-welfare footprint would be missing from the text of the reforms. In 
addition, as the case of the proposed work-life balance Directive shows, compromises 
could be sought, if the Directive is to gain the approval of the Council and the Parliament 
(Plomien, 2018).  
The same would likely apply to all legislative, and, thus binding, proposals that 
are to follow, especially if these purport to intervene with the national decision-making 






processes. Yet binding measures are necessary, for without them an exclusively soft-law 
Pillar would risk having the same negligible impact the OMC and Lisbon Agenda 
arguably did. Apart from the difficulties arising in trying to persuade the majority of the 
Member States to take up such initiatives voluntarily, soft-law as the sole policy choice 
risks having negative rule of law implications, in that it is difficult for challenges to be 
brought against soft-law measures (Armstrong, 2018). Not only that, but policy-making 
focused exclusively on soft-law, could moreover lead to allegations of an EU that prefers 
to abdicate responsibility by making social sustainability contingent upon the actions of 
the Member States at national level. Scharpf’s asymmetry will continue to exist, if Social 
Europe remains confined to coordination policies, without any entrenched legislative 
action (2010). In turn, such action would require a structural change in the primarily 
economic nature of the European constitution, something not as difficult to achieve as at 
first glance it appears to be (Atkinson, 2002). 
Binding proposals are, thence, essential to push for upwards convergence EU-
wide, and the proposed Directives are an essential step forward in the realisation of a 
fairer, and more socially sustainable Union. They go beyond a wish-list, in truly laying 
down some concrete foundations for the Commission’s vision of the Social Europe of 
tomorrow. Notwithstanding that, progress is still at embryonic stage. The proposals are 
just that, and how their final text will end up looking, is still unknown. Moreover, the 
reforms might take a while until they become reality, as the Posted Workers Directive 
saga shows. It took almost ten years following the controversial CJEU judgments in the 
Laval Quartet,1 for a substantial reform to finally be agreed (Zahn, 2017).  According to 
the most pessimistic scenario the Pillar’s ambition might not even materialise in the first 
place, drawing parallels with the failed proposals for changing the Maternity Leave 






Directive, after the proposed amendments were rejected by a blocking minority of 
Member States.
Despite these dangers, the Pillar and some of the measures accompanying it, 
namely the proposed European Labour Authority and the European Social Security 
Number, deserve credit for trying to reinforce aspects of EU Social citizenship, in their 
conceptualisation of a pan-European labour market with a mobile cross-border labour 
force. Nevertheless, these refer primarily to mobile EU citizens, who happen to be also 
workers. Current practice shows that atypical and non-standardised employment 
relationships are on the rise, and this might have as outcome the exclusion of a sizeable 
part of the population from the Labour Authority’s scope. That is why the Authority needs 
to gain more powers in supervising the application of the EU social acquis as a whole, 
and not just in cross-border situations, something though that the Member States might 
not be ready to compromise on. Furthermore, while the Pillar’s 20 rights and principles 
do not appear to distinguish in favour of mobile EU and/or economically active EU 
citizens, or to promote a particular definition of worker, the lack of specific 
accompanying initiatives that refrain from using the exercise of free movement rights, or 
certain economic activity as a prerequisite for people to fall under their umbrella, does 
admittedly very little to change the current state of affairs (Bruzelius et al, 2017). 
With a view to the future of a socially sustainable EU, the Pillar could thus benefit 
from both more breadth and teeth. More breadth in order cover without distinction the 
majority of EU citizens (scope), and to expand in areas that are not limited to the 
regulation of labour (content). Even though it is true that the competences of the Union 
are structured in a way that privileges intervention as regards to labour market policies 
over other welfare provisions, there is still leeway, in light of the more aspirational Treaty 






provisions centred around adequate social protection, to do more. Of course, taking 
concrete, and preferably binding measures, at least in those areas where policy-making 
has been normalised, is not enough. Ensuring adherence to the measures is key. The Pillar 
includes a scoreboard of targets, that can be used to measure their take up in each Member 
State, but could conditionality also be used if one truly wishes to drive the social acquis 
up quickly? Otherwise, the whole endeavour might simply end up becoming a box ticking 
exercise.  
Conclusion 
Social sustainability at EU level is in a state of flux. Proposals for new measures or 
reforms spur every few months or so, all set in motion following the pledge in the 
aftermath of the crisis for a social-triple A, largely encapsulated in the European Pillar of 
Social Rights and its accompanying initiatives. The latter try to tackle social sustainability 
in a diverse set of areas, with a particular focus in those of employment and social 
protection of workers. According to the definition given to the concept of social 
sustainability for the purposes of this article as the set of rules, policies and principle 
aiming to enrich and fortify the EU social acquis so as to render it immune from and a 
true counterweigh to the economic constitution, it seems that the ulterior objective of the 
measures in question is candidly to reinforce the image of a socially sustainable EU. 
There are doubts though as to how far this objective can be achieved by the proposed 
reforms. 
Much like past reforms, their aim is to up the social dimension of the European 
project and result in upwards convergence among Member States. They reaffirm that EU 
social policy-making has matured and is a far cry from the initially displayed ‘welfare 
neglect’. They also seem to have learned from the past. The overwhelmingly free market 






underpinned flexicurity paradigm has been largely set aside in favour of more autopoietic 
and autonomous welfare reforms. Unlike the past, the context and the drivers that support 
the Pillar era are stronger, and have the potential to make it weather any changes better 
than the initial Social Model of the 1990s. The rise in populism, the scathing attacks on 
the handling of the crisis, and the imminent UK departure, all created the right impetus 
for the EU to try and reinvent itself. Although not explicitly, ensuring sustainability, a 
notion interwoven with politics, was flagged up during the debates that followed, calling 
for a reinforcement of its -up until now weak- social pillar (Davidson, 2009). This is 
precisely what led to the creation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. 
Naturally, the Pillar is a work in progress, and as such any concrete evaluation of 
its legacy is at the moment difficult, if not impossible. It arguably demonstrates a renewed 
-and stronger- commitment towards a more substantial and resilient social dimension, but 
its execution is not flawless, with its soft-law aspects and the lack of carrots and sticks 
slowing down a swifter upwards harmonisation. Its scope and content could also be 
expanded to cover most manifestations of EU social citizenship and welfare provision. 
Yet it is a mostly welcomed development, representing a possible path-departure from 
the retrenchment of the crisis era. And much like its predecessors, it is inevitable that 
setbacks will occur throughout the process. At the same time, such strong commitment to 
the realisation of a genuinely social Social Europe was lacking from the relevant 
discourse. In that regard, the Pillar, by socialising the priorities of the Union arguably for 
the first time to such extent, represents a social renaissance. 
The title of the penultimate section of this article, which reflected on the recent 
reforms, was asking whether the Pillar can be perceived as a renaissance or a revolution. 
At the very end of the preceding paragraph, it was characterised as the former. But is a 






renaissance enough, or through enlightenment, a revolution has to come about for social 
sustainability to become entrenched in European integration? It is true that the reforms 
themselves are not daring enough to be called revolutionary, although perhaps 
understandably, given that compromises are unavoidable in EU policy-making. However, 
the legacy of the crisis and Brexit might count as quiet revolutions that are now 
permanently carved in the European memory, for such instances to be averted in the 
future. To do so, Europe has to become not only economically, but socially sustainable 
as well, demanding ‘well-informed, theoretically robust, yet pragmatic, social solutions’ 
(Vallance et al, 2011: 347).  
Solutions such as those embedded in the Pillar need not to be promoted 
exclusively by the EU institutions at EU level summits. For their take up to become 
reality, Member States’ leaders need to believe in them, and embed them into their 
national priorities as well. In that regard the Franco-German Meseberg Declaration of 
June 2018 does not fare well; the social dimension of the EU is absent from its text, 
despite it having been prioritised in the European agenda. The commitment needs to 
spread across all actors involved in the policy-making processes, or else it will be nothing 
other than a Chimera, an unrealised post-crisis, post-Brexit European dream, bearing 
similarities with some of its predecessors. To end on a hopeful note though, the new 
reforms encapsulated in the Pillar and its accompanying initiatives are a promising start, 
a moment that has to be seized for social sustainability at EU level to become a reality. 
Of course, much of what one can make of them depends on their perspective; the glass 
can only be half-full or half-empty. But one cannot ignore this, that the Pillar will 
positively fuel the Social Europe debate. 
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